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1. Firms, innovation and strategy 
 
Innovation lies at the heart of the competitive game among business firms. 
Such firms pursue strategies that blend efforts aimed at doing better what 
they are currently doing (in a cumulative and incremental way) with 
attempts to achieve performance improvements through leaps and 
breakthroughs (in a discontinuous way). 
Schumpeter (1934) provided one of the most classical contributions on 
innovation in business, by pointing out how the process of economic 
development is fueled by innovations that are carried out by entrepreneurs. 
These entrepreneurs are the subjects who can see new combinations of 
resources (rather than just adapting or improving existing combinations), 
and introduce such discontinuities so to create waves of innovation that 
affect economic cycles. Later on, Drucker (1954) underlined that there are 
two major kinds of innovation in business, that is: 1) in the product or 
service; 2) in the various skills and activities that are involved in supplying 
them. This distinction, broadly referring to the “what” (product or service) 
and to the “how” (the way in which the firm provides that product or 
service), to some extent mirrors the distinction between product and process 
innovation, something that has been a constant element within academic 
literature for a long time. Key well-known contributions that followed 
include Freeman et al. (1982), Dosi (1982), Abernathy and Clark (1985), 
Wheelwright and Clark (1992) and Christensen (1997). 
We would argue, however, that for quite some time a considerable share of 
research (and the corresponding literature) has tended to focus either on 
strategy (and strategic planning) or on innovation (technological innovation, 
or new product development). This implies that the degree of overlapping 
between studies on strategy and on innovation has not been as developed as 
one would normally expect. Some have pointed out that strategy and 
innovation to some extent have developed almost as separate schools of 
thought, with the lack of a unitary view (Schlegelmilch et al. 2003). 
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We would also add that when more attention was given to establish a better 
bridge across the issues of strategy and innovation (particularly during the 
1990s), a wide range of labels and definitions came into play, generating a 
bit of confusion. The literature examining situations when firms carry out 
some forms of innovation in their strategy in a somewhat discontinuous way 
includes a wide range of terms such as “competitive innovation” (Hamel 
and Prahalad 1994), “strategic innovation” or “strategy innovation” (Baden-
Fuller 1995, Tushman et al. 1997), “strategic revolution” (Hamel 1996), 
“value innovation” (Kim and Mauborgne 1997), “breakthrough strategy” 
(Markides 1999) and many others such as “disruptive strategy”, “radical 
change”, “quantum change”, “reinvention”, “business model innovation” 
and so on. 
Broadly speaking, these labels have generally been used to describe 
situations in which firms have operated a considerable change in the way 
they compete, innovating their strategy with a marked difference from the 
approach adopted by firms that were traditionally considered as competitors. 
In these situations the traditional labels of product and process innovation 
have appeared no longer capable of fully capturing the variety of situations 
emerging, so to generate a need for new labels / concepts. 
While the international success (particularly among practitioners) of the 
“Blue ocean strategy” book (Kim and Mauborgne 2005) made the issue of 
strategy innovation quite popular among a wider audience outside the 
research community, over the last decade there has been a proliferation of 
work focusing on issues that cross both strategy and innovation, with 
renewed interest (Teece 2010), and with the emergence of business models 
(and business model innovation) as an important concept (Zott et al. 2011). 
The goal of this paper is therefore: 
- to review the relevant literature relating to strategy innovation (with 
some reference to business models), with the particular aim of 
understanding whether different labels and definitions refer to a 
common underlying phenomenon; 
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- to shed some light on the nature and types of strategy innovation that 
firms carry out in the business domain, using also the application of the 
concepts to three innovative firms. 
On the first point, we will argue that to a considerable extent all these labels 
can be reconciled under a common definition of “strategy innovation”, and 
the basic constituents of strategy innovation can be better understood when 
using the business model category, so that business model innovation 
broadly refers to the same thing (in other words, strategy innovation consists 
in business model innovation, that is a reconfiguration of the business 
model). 
On the second point, we will discuss the intensity and types of innovation, 
drawing some considerations and comments for future research. 
 
2. Reviewing the concept of strategy innovation in 1990s literature 
 
During the 1990s the scholars trying to describe cases of innovative firms 
(firms that were pursuing a rather different strategic conduct than their 
typical competitors in the industry) started looking for concepts that could 
go beyond the traditional notions of product and process innovation. To this 
respect, this part contains a review of the most relevant contributions that 
are believed to be functional to a broader understanding of the issue, and 
then to elaborate our own proposed interpretation. 
 
One of the early appearances of the label “strategic innovation” can be 
traced back to Baden Fuller and Stopford (1994, 53), who intended it as the 
creation of combinations of actions that hitherto were deemed impossible. 
Such combinations can be promoted either by incumbents or by entrants, 
that appear as “rejuvenators” in a given industry, resolving trade-offs such 
as variety vs. efficiency, quality vs. productivity, speed vs. flexibility, and 
so on. The firms operating such innovation manage to exploit creativity in 
choosing scale, product ranges, geographical territory, distribution formats, 
and so on. While it has often been common to talk about a “mature 
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industry”, the authors point out how maturity is a state of mind, and industry 
rejuvenation requires the effort and creativity to identify new ways of 
organizing the business and promoting organizational change.  
Among the most widely known rejuvenators one can find quite old 
examples such as Ford in the early XX century with the cheap production of 
standardized cars that opened up the room for a mass market. McDonald’s 
is another example, with the development of newly designed equipment, 
new standards for quality, training and building, new forms of distribution 
through franchising on a large scale. In the clothing industry Benetton has 
represented a classical example of developing mass fashion at low cost. In 
the case of Benetton, for example, the company has managed to rejuvenate 
the clothing industry of the time by operating in various forces including 
customer preferences (focusing on a young fashion image), technology and 
supply possibilities (by developing small, stand-alone low cost outlets 
operated in franchising schemes, as well as by promoting network-like 
production cycles), competitors’ blind spots (the fact that most competitors 
ignored that segment). 
As one can see, the definition proposed by Baden Fuller and Stopford 
(1994) echoes Schumpeter: the authors emphasize the fact that incumbents 
perceive the industry as mature and “rejuvenators” see and apply new 
combinations. 
 
Another interpretation by Normann and Ramirez (1993) relies on the 
concept of “reconfiguration”, intended as the reallocation of activities 
among the actors involved, through the unbundling and re-bundling of 
individual components, at three different levels, that is 1) offering; 2) 
organization; 3) mental images or organization concepts in own minds. A 
classical example proposed by the authors is that of Ikea, where activities 
are shifted among actors, in a mode that can be relieving (for example by 
offering self-service assembly the company eliminates the burden and the 
cost of assembly) and/or enabling (for example in-store availability allows 
browsing and impulse buying). Perhaps a distinctive element of the 
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contribution by Normann and Ramirez is the view of “value constellation” 
that stretches outside the traditional value chain proposed by Porter, by 
looking at activities both inside and outside the firm: the reconfiguration of 
activities encompass both dimensions, with varying mechanisms of value 
creation and appropriation. 
Within this definition the focus is on the value chain (value constellation) as 
the business architecture capable of innovating the building blocks of the 
firm’s strategy. 
 
Hamel and Prahalad (1994) discuss how organizational transformations by 
some firms can lead to “industry transformation”. There are newcomers 
who manage to change industry rules, as well as incumbents who 
successfully regenerate their core strategies reinventing the industry. 
According to the authors, strategy should be more path-breaking rather than 
based on benchmarking (in other words, it should deal more with 
revolutionary change than with incremental change). As the authors point 
out, firms should concentrate more on finding innovative ways of doing 
business rather than trying to achieve greater performance over competitors 
within the established way of doing business. In metaphorical terms, the 
authors advocate for a role that is not just that of the engineer (focusing on 
maintenance) but also that of the architect (designing new possibilities), 
based on foresight and stretching the goals towards new paradigms. As a 
consequence, the competitive challenge is less concerned with re-
engineering processes and more concerned with regenerating strategies, and 
the competition for opportunity share becomes more important than the 
competition for market share itself. Within this scheme the authors 
emphasize how elements such as foresight (seeing through what can be 
done anticipating the market or the competition) become more important 
than positioning (adopting the optimal position given the current 
circumstances) and, similarly, stretch (developing initiatives outside the 
current domain and sphere of influence) matters more than fit (matching the 
inside and outside elements). The authors stress the role of imagination, 
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underlining that “getting to the future first is not just about outrunning 
competitors bent on reaching the same prize. It is also about having one’s 
own view of what the prize is. There can be as many prizes as runners; 
imagination is the only limiting factor. … In business, as in art, what 
distinguishes leaders from laggards and greatness from mediocrity is the 
ability to uniquely imagine what could be” (Hamel and Prahalad 1994, 25). 
According to the authors, the problem lies in the notion of strategy that 
predominates in most companies, and strategic planning should be 
superseded by a focus on “crafting the strategic architecture”, with a bias for 
radical actions. 
 
Tushman, Anderson and O’Reilly (1997) relate strategic innovation to the 
capability of a firm to be ambidextrous in carrying out both incremental and 
discontinuous change. Innovations that determine a re-writing of the 
industry rules require also a re-writing of the organizational rules for the 
company. We could raise some comments on the choice of the 
“ambidexterity” label: while for individuals ambidexterity refers to the 
capability to write (or carry out specific tasks) by using both the left and the 
right hand (in other words, the same function can be carried out in two 
different ways) here the authors use this concept when a firm carries out two 
different activities (incremental vs. discontinuous change). As one can see, 
there is some degree of mismatch between the actual word meaning and the 
concept that the authors intended. However, we should not divert our 
attention to these details, but rather observe that this contribution associates 
strategic innovation with the ability of a firm to move at the same time 
through a process of incremental improvement and discontinuous 
innovation. These two domains are also referred to in terms of 
“exploitation” (of a current position / domain) and “exploration” (of new 
positions / domains). Firms capable of coupling the exploitation of their 
current strategic position to the exploration of new business spaces can aim 
at performance leaps that can redefine the industry structure. 
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Work by Kim and Mauborgne (1997 and 1999), that gained much 
popularity among practitioners in recent years, places considerable 
emphasis on concepts such as “new market space” and “value innovation”. 
The first concept relates to situations in which firms carry out an innovation 
that considerably amplifies the size of a business, or creates a wholly new 
one. When such space is radically new, the authors later on use the “blue 
ocean” category (Kim and Mauborgne 2005), as opposed to “red oceans”, 
that is situations where a high number of competitors keep on playing the 
game in a rather similar way. Within “red oceans”, competing firms keep on 
pursuing operational efficiency within a common framework, while firms 
looking for “blue oceans” can aim at occupying business spaces that are not 
currently attacked by any player. “Value innovation” corresponds to an 
initiative that manages to break the traditional trade-off between cost and 
differentiation, redefining the cost-to-value proposition to the customer. 
Within this perspective, strategy innovation starts from a redefinition of the 
offering that triggers the entry into a new market space. 
 
This review of contributions in literature during the 1990s is clearly not 
exhaustive, as there are other authors who, to varying degrees, define and 
deal with the notion of strategy innovation. We believe however that these 
contributions constitute a relevant critical mass, as most other authors tend 
to revolve around similar concepts. On the basis of the set of contributions 
highlighted so far, we can therefore extract some of the basic components of 
strategy innovation as described in 1990s literature, being (figure 1): 
- a redefinition of the offering by escaping the trade-off between cost and 
differentiation (Kim and Mauborgne 1997-1999); this happens by 
focusing on overserved customers or on non-customers (rather than on 
existing customers), identifying ways to considerably grow the market; 
- a reconfiguration of the value chain by shifting some activities among 
all the actors involved (both inside and outside the company) (Normann 
and Ramirez 1993); 
Leonardo Buzzavo - Strategy Innovation as Business Model Reconfiguration 
 9 
- an attempt to play a new competitive game rather than trying to be better 
than competitors in playing the traditional game (Hamel and Prahalad 
1994); this transforms the industry and its boundaries through 
considerable volume growth and/or the establishment of quite different 
standards of competition (Baden-Fuller and Stopford 1994). 
 
Fig. 1. Core aspects of strategy innovation from review of literature in the 
1990s 
 
Customer offering 
 
Value innovation breaks cost-differentiation trade-off and can create new market-space 
(Kim and Mauborgne, 1997-1999) 
 
Value chain 
 
Business reconfiguration by shifting activities in the inside-outside chain (Normann and 
Ramirez, 1993) 
 
Industry transformation 
 
Strategy should be more path-breaking rather than benchmarking competitors (Hamel and 
Prahalad, 1994) 
 
New combinations can lead to new strategies that rejuvenate an industry by transforming its 
balance of power and its boundaries (Baden-Fuller and Stopford, 1994) 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
In summary, strategy innovation implies a redefinition of the target market 
and the product provided, along with a transformation in the firm’s value 
chain (in particular the choices about “make or buy” for given set of 
processes), in such way that the overall industry is transformed (generation 
of new demand, shifting equilibrium among players, etc.). These elements 
pave the way for the type of debate that took off during the following 
decade, involving business models. 
 
3. Business models in 2000s: a tool to grasp strategy innovation 
 
While the 1990s have seen a sparkling flow of contributions over strategy 
innovation, most of which have been reviewed above, over the following 
decade the notion of business models gained much popularity. 
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We can identify a contribution by Markides (1997 and 2000) as a sort of 
juncture on this regard, with its focus on the “breaking of the rules”, where 
strategy innovation relates to a firm’s capability to challenge the established 
ways of doing business in an industry, basically by redefining: 
- a new “who”, that is which customers is the firm targeting; 
- a new “what”, meaning what product-service the firm is offering; 
- a new “how”, that is what type of strategic position the firm is exploiting 
in making the product and capturing the value. 
Strategy innovation occurs when a company identifies gaps in the industry 
positioning map, decides to fill them, and the gaps grow to become the new 
mass market. In these terms, strategy innovation consists in a re-
conceptualization of what the business is about, leading to a different way 
of playing the game in an existing business. According to Markides (2000, 
35), a business is an organization’s biggest mental model. Any mental 
model can be overcome by identifying and questioning them, using 
outsiders, benchmarking outside the industry, experimenting new ideas, 
providing facts or examples that go against conventional wisdom. Strategy 
innovation can be pursued via various combinations of the “who”, “what” 
and “how”, through various sequences. As one can see, this definition has 
much in common with previous elements identified in Hamel and Prahalad 
(1994), as well as reinstating the relevance of the (Schumpeterian) 
“combination” elements referred to the various ingredients of a business. 
So, strategy innovation basically results from the ability of a firm (residing 
in one or more of its decision makers) to identify a new combination of 
tangible and intangible resources that encompasses two or more key 
elements of its strategy (i.e. the offering, the linkages to the market, the set 
of activities involved in generating it, the mechanisms of value 
appropriation) that existing players either were not capable of seeing, or 
were not capable of implementing. 
The ability to “see through” (that is typical of the Schumpeterian image of 
the entrepreneur) relates to the ability to conceive new combinations and/or 
sense customer preferences and needs that are not fully met by current 
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players. Some attention to over-served customers can make the way for a 
redefinition of the offering in a low-cost mode, while some attention to non-
customers might reveal un-tackled potential for satisfying a considerable 
portion of demand (Christensen 1997). 
We could then argue (in line with Markides 2000) that strategy innovation 
consists in a reconfiguration of the way in which a firm organizes its 
business, read through the lens of Drucker (1954) terms. In substance, 
strategy innovation relates to a substantial reconfiguration of the business 
model. It should be noted that “business model” has become a quite popular 
concept in management literature particularly in recent years, with a great 
deal of contributions (also with many different interpretations). A fertile 
literature on “business models” has somewhat hinted at its presumed 
capability of providing a more operational translation of the sometimes-
vague notion of “strategy”, in the present effort to capture the dynamics of 
innovation promoted by firms across various industries. 
Some of the most relevant contributions in academic literature that have 
sparked great interest over business models are those by Amit and Zott 
(2001) and Magretta (2002). They both look at business models as broadly 
based on three major elements: “who are the customers”, “how is the 
company intending to provide value to them”, and finally “how is the 
company extracting value out of it”. To a considerable extent, this has 
echoes of the previously quoted definition of a business by Drucker (1954), 
albeit with different nuances. 
Early introduction of the business model category took place within domain 
of information management and ICT contexts. As a matter of fact, the term 
grew very popular during the internet boom in the 1990s, and it became a 
building block of almost every company operating in internet environments 
during the fervid years of the e-business revolution. At that time, it was 
typical for companies to develop innovative ways of arranging production 
and distribution activities, and the business model category acted as a sort of 
interpretative (as well as normative) element to discuss the way in which the 
firm was going to generate value and extract it from target customers. 
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Later on, business model as a key notion grew even more outside e-business 
contexts and heavily permeated academic literature on strategy, with a 
growing number of contributions, among which we single out just 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002), Lehmann-Ortega and Schoettl (2005), 
Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart (2010), Teece (2010), Baden-fuller and 
Morgan (2010). An up-to-date comprehensive review of the most relevant 
literature can be found in Zott et al. (2011). 
Unfortunately, as with every terms that becomes popular, the term business 
model has been suffering over time an ever-growing number of definitions 
that have not yet produced a satisfactory level of agreement. When one 
carefully examines all the literature on the topic, one soon realizes that most 
differences lie in two major aspects: 1) how the notion of business model 
relates to that of strategy, and 2) the ingredients of a business model. We do 
not intend to reproduce here all the nuances and the complexity that are 
typical of this debate, suggesting the interested reader to directly deal with 
the related literature. With respect to the first aspect (how the notion of 
business model relates to the notion of strategy) one can find a convincing 
enough argument in Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart (2010). With respect to 
the second aspect, a more detailed (and more normative) approach to 
identify the constituents of a business model can be found in Osterwalder 
and Pigneur (2009) who articulate business model along nine ingredients. 
On the whole, a thorough review of all relevant literature can be found in 
Zott et al. 2011.  
Aside from these complications, what we like to point out is that on the 
whole the category of business model provides some utility, both to the 
academic and to the practitioner, to identify in a more operational way the 
strategy of a company. In other words, the usefulness of a business model, 
however intended, is to push towards the identification of the basic 
constituents of a strategy, and particularly of the way in which a company 
aims at producing value. Also, the concept seems to provide, to some extent, 
some basis to bridge strategy and organization studies, as well as some 
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issues related to the gap between strategy design and implementation. On 
the whole, it serves as an input to fully read strategy innovation. 
In summary, we could aim at achieving a distillation of the existing 
literature – and much in line with the contribution by Drucker (1954) - by 
arguing that a business model is made of decisions regarding: 
- the target (who) - who is the target of the company; 
- the offering (what) - what is the company providing the intended target 
with; 
- the chain of processes involved (how), both inside and outside the 
company, that are generating the offering in question; 
- the profit model - how a company is extracting value from the target 
customers in a profitable manner. 
As a consequence, we can argue that strategy innovation, as it emerged in 
literature during the 1990s consists in business model innovation, that is a 
reconfiguration of the business model: in substance, the individual 
components of a business model are combined in such a way that departs 
from established ways of competing. 
These four elements can act as a supporting checklist when trying to 
identify the key drivers of the strategy of a firm and examining its 
similarities and differences versus competitors. 
We could use these four ingredients to look in more detail at four innovative 
companies, each of which has represented some departure from the 
traditional approach adopted in the industry, redefining the rules of the 
game. 
 
4. Looking at four innovative companies 
 
This part aims at complementing the reasoning carried out on the basis of 
selected contributions from literature, by looking at real-world examples of 
companies that have been selected as their innovative strategies have often 
been looked at as falling outside the traditional product/process categories, 
with a broader perspective often linked to strategy innovation. These 
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examples are Ikea (the Swedish firm that revolutionized the furniture 
industry worldwide), Ryanair (the low-cost airline that adopted the strategy 
pioneered by Southwest in the US market achieving a vast growth in 
Europe), Technogym (the Italian firm that transformed the fitness / wellness 
industry with its products and approach to market), and Apple (the US firm 
whose i-Pod and i-Tunes developments have represented a major success 
since the early 2000s). We will now aim at recalling the most relevant traits 
of the innovation carried out by each of these companies, in order to better 
grasp the notion of strategy innovation. 
 
An example of reinvention in the furniture industry: Ikea 
We could argue that the home furniture industry could be briefly divided 
into a pre-Ikea era, and a post-Ikea era, given the depth of the 
transformation that this Swedish company has introduced. Before Ikea, 
customers could basically choose between furniture stores that worked 
mainly on a sales-by-catalogue mode, with some lead time involved, and 
stores with readily-available pieces of furniture, albeit limited in breadth of 
offering and in design features. Ikea has managed to introduce a set of 
changes that include a new product concept, an innovative marketing mix, a 
reconfigured set of processes, leading to an offering that could bring both 
low costs and new value for customers. Its business grew so to exceed in 
2010 total sales of €  23 billion, 127,000 employees and stores in 38 
countries. 
Low costs could be obtained mainly through: 
- a product design policy focused on low cost, also with an extensive use 
of modular designs; 
- a self-assembly proposition that could eliminate a considerable share of 
labor costs, leveraging on the customers’ willingness to carry out 
assembly on their own; 
- the use of a self-service shopping mode that allowed to cut down the 
workforce in stores; 
- long-term agreement with suppliers; 
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- an emphasis on a high stock turn. 
Greater value for customers could mainly derive from: 
- a wide degree of variety obtained through recombination of modular 
components; 
- large stores allowing customers to physically browse products and 
explore many design suggestions, ranging from furniture items to a wide 
range of accessories;  
- year-round stocking allowing impulse buying and immediate 
availability. 
Ikea has managed to create a wholly new marketing mix (new products with 
a widely recognized brand, affordable prices, specific communication 
policies and a distribution strategy with many features in common with fast-
moving consumer goods), with a reorganized value chain (assembly has 
been shifted from suppliers to customers), and its formula has been 
replicated worldwide, building upon a great degree of elasticity of demand 
for affordable furniture. In particular, the availability of affordable items 
with an attractive design has determined an increase in demand for those 
segments of customers that did not have a sufficient time horizon ahead to 
consider buying new furniture (e.g. college students, people with frequent 
relocations, etc.). During the last two decades, Ikea has become capable of 
drawing various customer segments, ranging from college students to 
newlyweds to elder customers. 
 
Reinventing strategy in a mature industry: Ryanair 
In the airline industry for many decades a very tight regulation existed over 
many aspects of the business, including fares. This implied that, albeit 
controlling costs was clearly a key strategic factor, over time airlines began 
putting growing efforts into differentiating their offering to the eyes of 
customers. This translated into more and more attention to the quality of 
service (for example interior aircraft design, in-flight services and 
amenities, ground services, etc.), in order to achieve higher degrees of 
customer satisfaction and loyalty. 
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After a process of de-regulation, a new model emerged first in the US 
(pioneered by Southwest) and then in Europe (pioneered by Ryanair), 
providing a dramatic impulse to industry growth and a transformation of the 
overall landscape. Differently from traditional players, low-cost airlines 
focused on providing a scheduled short-haul service between two cities 
(point-to-point), with a considerable “stripping” of the product, by removing 
a lot of features traditionally included, but that customers were ready to give 
up in exchange for lower fares and new opportunities of mobility. The 
highly articulated business architecture focusing on low costs, coupled with 
a growing demand exploiting the high elasticity induced by low fares, and 
the possibility to open new routes in second-tier airports (not the typical 
strategic battleground for large traditional airlines) triggered a virtuous 
circle for key players (such as the leading Ryanair) in exploiting this new 
approach of doing business. Ryanair grew to a total revenue of over €  3.6 
billion in 2011 and over 72 million passengers flown, with over 8,800 
employees and a fleet of over 270 aircraft.  
Traditional airlines featured strategic inertia, partly explained by their public 
or semi-public ownership structure, but can also be interpreted in terms of 
some sort of ‘marketing myopia’ (Levitt, 1975). Traditional players grew 
when airline transport was primarily an elite activity (consumers with high 
disposable income, business travelers), while low cost players have begun 
targeting new customer segments, providing them with a travel experience 
fitting with tighter budgets and different lifestyles. With a much higher 
focus on cost control, they operated a redefinition of the offering by seizing 
new business potential lying in new routes and new customer segments. 
Key aspects of the low-cost strategy include (Buzzavo 2007): 
- a specific business focus and product redefinition: point-to-point travel 
mainly in second tier airports, elimination of many “frills” (benefits) in 
flight and on-the-ground, one class of service; 
- a new chain of activities: much standardization (fleet with single-type 
aircraft, human resource costs), low turnaround times, direct 
distribution; 
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- a new economics: low costs, scale and learning economies coupled with 
growing volumes (high elasticity, higher flight frequency and load 
factors). 
While not all new entrants attempted to imitate the model successfully 
adopted by Ryanair (and Easyjet, to mention another key player), the former 
managed to keep on growing by exploiting a combined set of factors 
including: first-mover advantage (opening new routes with interesting 
business potential), scale and learning economies (continuously reducing 
costs through scale and experience), and an intricate set of self-reinforcing 
complementarities making it difficult for other players (particularly 
traditional airlines) to fight back. 
 
An example of business transformation in the fitness industry: Technogym 
Technogym is a company that has been capable of moving ahead of the 
competition by identifying emergent customer needs. By “emergent” we 
refer to needs that are not yet fully visible to incumbents. The firm has 
basically invented the business of wellness by starting from the position of 
sports equipment manufacturer. Founded in 1983 in Gambettola (near Forlì-
Cesena in Emilia Romagna, Italy), it has quickly moved it to become 
undisputable market leader in the international scene, with sales of over € 
350 million and over 2,000 employees. Technogym has put its “customer 
sensing” capabilities to good use (Day 1994) and become capable of “seeing 
what’s next” (Christensen et al. 1994), occupying a new strategic space and 
developing a specific focus and competences directed towards a targeted 
offering, laying the basis for a vast success. The aspects that Technogym 
managed to understand in anticipation were: 
- fitness machines were becoming more and more relevant not just for 
young and physically healthy people but also for other types of 
customers as well; 
- fitness equipment was becoming an important product at home, and not 
just in specialized fitness centers, and therefore equipment should be 
easier to install and to use for private customers; 
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- fitness should not just be seen as a functional activity but rather in a 
broader sense as an emotional concept, leading to a concept of wellness 
that related to a lifestyle; 
- it was key to ensure the equipment’s capability to adjust to individual 
needs by using customer information, and this same customer 
information could become knowledge with strategic relevance. 
The first two aspects matter because on the one hand it expanded the 
potential market, and on the other it led to identify the conditions for 
expanding the scope of traditional professional sports equipment to adjust it 
to this broader target (Bonaccorsi 2006). 
On the third aspect, one should note that it was Technogym itself to invent 
the “wellness” term as an extension of the fitness concept into the realm of 
lifestyle, and incorporating a more emotional perspective. The term itself 
(that has been officially registered) has become incorporated into the 
company’s payoff (Technogym – The Wellness company). 
The fourth aspect also relates to the capability to identify emerging 
customer needs, as the equipment can actually operate with a one-to-one 
logic with all the consequential benefits of customization and effectiveness 
in the customer relationship. As effectively pointed out by Huang (2001), 
Technogym’s wellness system is both a physical and a virtual environment 
that is built around a central customer database that ensures that the 
equipment adjusts to customer preferences and physical conditions. With 
the use of hardware keys and passwords, the equipment automatically 
selects the proper weights, seats move to the right position, and even the 
appropriate music can be played. When customer exercise, dedicated 
screens indicate recommended routines and pace, according to individual 
physical profiles and exercise programs. Even more interesting, every time 
that a customer works out information is stored in the database, so that the 
equipment continuously adapt to customers’ progresses. Customers 
themselves can track their progress (also through a website), but also 
trainers can use the data to monitor developments. These aspects reinforce 
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at the same time the one-to-one customization, the accumulation of 
knowledge, and the emotional connection with the customer. 
The unique capability of Technogym’s founder in identifying emerging 
customer needs, as well as promoting a new wellness culture, has been 
integrated over time with a marked emphasis on research and development, 
that materializes in the conspicuous investment in dedicated scientists and 
engineers to that purpose (Sahay et al. 2004; Simon 2009). 
The Technogym example shows how a firm can achieve both a 
differentiation advantage (e.g. with elements such as brand, unique offering, 
product features, one-to-one customization) and a cost advantage with 
respect to the scale economies that can be achieved by having tapped into a 
vast potential market, as well as the learning economies that are in place 
when maintaining the company constantly on the verge of the innovation 
frontier. We can argue that Technogym has managed to create a wholly new 
business space by operating a re-conceptualization of the product and of the 
market itself. 
 
An example of creation of a new market-space: Apple’s i-Pod and i-Tunes 
Apple’s i-Pod and i-Tunes represent another interesting case to look at, 
when trying to uncover the features of strategy innovation (as a matter of 
fact, the later advent of i-phone and then i-pad also represent additional 
interesting cases. In this work, however, we will limit our focus to the i-pod 
story). In the early 2000s Apple had looked at the existing portable MP3 
music players and had spotted the opportunity to promote its own player 
with a unique mix of branding, design and functionalities. These features 
were highly related to the development of the i-Tunes software (meant to be 
used in the computer to play and organize music), and later on of the i-
Tunes music store that has become since then a key player in the online 
music market. 
While Apple was not the first company to introduce a portable audio player 
for music files (for example, the “Zen” player developed by the company 
Creative was already available in the marketplace), Apple could achieve a 
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very low time-to-market (in the order of 12 months) by adopting a modular 
production strategy, defined also “Lego” model of production (Berger 
2005). This approach implied the development of a product that was made 
up of existing components, manufactured by individual suppliers. One 
should consider that the stages that go from the definition of a new product 
(be it a completely new product or the updating or upgrading of an existing 
one) usually involve a complex interaction of activities and subjects that can 
stretch over a considerable length of time. In industries where the rate of 
innovation is considerable, be it because of factors such as evolving 
consumer preferences, intense competition, fast technological 
improvements, a firm’s ability to reduce the time-to-market undoubtedly 
represents a key competitive driver, since on the one hand it allows to firm 
to be addressing the target market with a product that features new traits that 
are believed to be valuable at the eyes of customers (differentiation), and on 
the other hand it can keep costs down by compressing the actual amount of 
resources involved in the set of activities going from concept to market, 
including delays and errors that can occur. 
Apple’s business formula was to design and market a product that, being 
made of existing modules, could be developed rapidly and efficiently, 
assembled (by a third party) like they were simple Lego blocks. At the time 
of the introduction of the i-pod, the major components were the hard drive 
(made by Toshiba), the touch-operated control mechanism (made by Nidec), 
the processor (made by ARM), the firewire port (made by TI), the USB 
interface (made by Cypress) and the flash memory-unit (made by Sharp). 
Invetec in Taiwan carried out final assembly, so that Apple could 
completely outsource manufacturing, while concentrating on the marketing 
and on the complementary “soft” aspects of i-Tunes software and store. 
Apple’s business idea allowed it to rapidly enter the market with a original 
player that, thanks to its unique brand image and peculiar functionalities, 
rapidly gained market share allowing for great economies of scale, while 
enjoying a relevant premium price that allowed rewarding margins. Over 
time, Apple has expanded the range of i-pods (with the introduction of the 
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Nano, the Shuffle, etc.) and of the related products (such as the i-Phone and 
the i-Pad), pursuing a similar “Lego” strategy. The strategy adopted by 
Apple allowed to be quite fast in turning an idea into a product available in 
the marketplace, entering the industry with a markedly differentiated 
product, and at the same time keeping costs down thanks to its choice of 
production mode and its growing opportunities for scale economies after the 
market success. 
Apple’s strategy has completely redefined portable devices in a way that 
affects many product arenas including mobile phones, laptop computers, as 
well as the whole music distribution industry. Besides the peculiar “Lego” 
model of production, Apple was first in adopting a completely new design 
focus on electronic items: its focus on minimalism and user-interfaces has 
redefined industry standards, in a way that no competitor can ignore. 
 
5. Reading strategy innovation as a reconfiguration of the business 
model 
 
The illustration of these four cases provides an opportunity to read strategy 
innovation as a reconfiguration of the business model (in other words, 
business model innovation), with a summary provided in figure 2. 
 
The who (target) and the what (offering) 
The first two elements of the business models that are reconfigured by 
strategy innovation are the "who" (target) and the "what" (offering). It is 
functional to read them in conjunction to grasp their relevant features. Here 
value innovation breaks the cost-differentiation trade-off by typically 
focusing outside the existing customer base.  
Differently from the established industry practice, Ikea focused heavily on a 
specific target, consisting of customers with lower willingness to pay, 
customers looking for one-stop shop and fun in furniture, and customers 
willing to self-assemble. Through its broad offering of low-cost items, some 
self-assembled, in large stores spread within chain, Ikea began offering low 
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costs but also greater customer value in the degree of choice and modern 
design, its one-stop shopping format and in the entertaining element of the 
shopping experience. Its model has allowed to considerably grow sales 
volumes, by leveraging on new segments (e.g. college students).  
Ryanair has moved away from the traditional focus on product 
differentiation through the addition of enhanced features and shifted its 
target to the vast un-tackled mass of customers looking for cheap air 
transportation. The airline managed to simplify and standardize the product 
compared to the traditional industry approach. 
Technogym has innovated by focusing its business on customers interested 
in home use, customers looking for greater ease-of-use and greater 
interaction, customers more emotionally involved, customers sensitive on 
overall “well-being”. The company has managed to develop fitness 
machines blending function and emotions, providing ease of install and ease 
of use, plus an innovative way of using customer information, pursuing 
scale economies so to make available quite evolved and sophisticated 
products to growing segments of private customers.  
Apple began focusing on customers willing to pay extra for design, 
customers looking for new user interfaces, customers valuing ability to 
customize music libraries. The company has been capable of offering new 
value (carrying around one’s whole music library in a fashionable design 
item) that well captured customers’ willingness to pay and drew more and 
more customers to its product. 
 
The how (chain) 
Another key dimension is the way the firm organizes its processes in the 
value chain. Ikea has heavily focused on modular design through long-term 
agreement with suppliers, but it has also shifted some activities to customers 
(e.g. self-service shopping and self-assembly).  
Ryanair managed to achieve considerable standardization, scale and 
learning based on the simplification of the core product, along many 
segments of the chain (production, distribution, human resources, etc.). 
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Technogym managed to use information technology so that fitness 
machines could store customer information and provide guidance to 
exercise, eliminating much need for instructors and trainers. Besides 
providing greater value to customers, this triggered scale and learning 
economies in the production process. 
Apple developed a Lego-like model of production (Berger 2005) featuring 
short time-to-market, while focusing on product and software design and 
marketing, with complete outsourcing of production and assembly 
 
The profit model 
All these four companies have adopted a profit model that was different 
from common practice. Ikea has adopted a model similar to fast-moving 
customer goods, aiming at greater share of customer wallet through wider 
shopping basket revolving around furniture items. Ryanair managed to 
couple low costs with scale and learning economies exploiting a high 
elasticity of demand that allowed low fares to activate new segments of 
demand. Technogym has focused on extracting higher willingness-to-pay 
and generating large sales volumes exploiting worldwide market. Apple has 
been gaining from both premium price and volume effects, with music 
player margins plus music store margins (see fig. 2). 
These four examples (Ikea, Ryanair, Technogym and Apple) represent 
situations in which the type of innovation promoted by the company has 
determined a rather radical departure from the traditional way of operating 
within the respective business domain: they all have operated a blend of 
product and process innovation, with a transformation of the business space. 
In other terms, after these innovations were introduced the industries in 
question have been transformed in a way that competing firms could not 
ignore: customers have incorporated the new “rules” of the offering that 
have become a standard to relate to. 
Ikea has redefined the traditional price-performance constituents in the 
furniture industry, creating a new market space. Its approach has a marked 
emphasis on low cost but also providing unique customer value, 
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determining an evolution of the furniture industry. Its type of strategy 
innovation is not too distant from that of Ryanair, with the introduction of 
the low-cost strategy based on a simplified product and a standardized 
process exploiting the high elasticity of demand. 
 
Fig. 2. Reading strategy innovation as reconfiguration of the business model 
(business model innovation) 
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Technogym has redefined the fitness-machine industry by adopting a new 
way of looking at the customer offering and creating a “wellness” category. 
This has determined the industry to evolve with a marked emphasis on 
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customer unique value provided, in a way that resembles what Starbucks 
has been doing in coffee shops. 
Apple with its products has coupled a new product with a new process in a 
revolutionary supply chain. It has completely redesigned more than one 
industry, coupling product development, production and marketing skills in 
a unique way. 
In all these four cases there are innovative elements that encompass the 
offering (its value-price dimensions), the links to the market, the value 
chain, with changes that depart from the traditional way of competing, with 
the effect of transforming the industry. 
It is worth exploiting a little further the basic traits and the building blocks 
of these innovations. 
 
6. The dynamics of strategy innovation 
 
This part aims at a better understanding of the dynamics of strategy 
innovation. Firstly, strategy innovation is examined through the lens of the 
key types of innovations proposed by Christensen (1997), that is sustaining 
innovations, low-cost disruption and market disruption. As we will see, 
strategy innovation (business model innovation) contains a combination of 
these. 
Secondly, strategy innovation is explored by looking at the intensity of the 
reconfiguration in each element of the business model. As we will see, 
individual components of the business model might depart more or less 
dramatically from the approach adopted by existing players, and innovative 
firms might promote strategy innovations in quite different ways. What 
matters, however, is the ability to make these choices internally consistent 
so that they are self-reinforcing and capable of complementing each other 
(Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart 2011). 
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Sustaining innovation, low-cost disruption and new-market disruption 
An interesting opportunity to look inside strategy innovations comes from 
work by Christensen (1997). The author does not explicitly talks about 
strategy innovation, but discusses innovation processes in general, but his 
reasoning is functional to shed some light on our path. He proposes three 
major types of innovations: 
- sustaining; 
- low-end disruption; 
- new market disruption. 
Sustaining innovations involve an improvement in performance for the 
attributes that are most valued by existing customers (particularly the most 
demanding ones). The key target consists in the most profitable customers: 
the firm can tackle new performance attributes thanks to their higher 
willingness to pay. 
Low-end disruptions involve a different business models that aims at 
providing a low cost offering. In such sense innovations of this type address 
over-served customers, and the disruption can take place as the innovating 
company can attract customers interested into the low cost offering, who 
can abandon other providers. 
New market disruptions are innovations where the firm is capable of 
competing against non-consumption. Non-customers basically constitute the 
target, and the firm’s initiative can determine a market expansion if not the 
whole creation of wholly new market space (that other company can later 
aim at serving). 
As one can understand, sustaining innovations correspond to firms 
competing for performance improvements, while low-end disruptions can 
generate substantial redistribution of market shares when an innovative 
player can steal large shares of customers from other players through its 
low-cost attractiveness. In most cases customers are happy to give up some 
product features that they do not consider so valuable, in favor of the 
offering whose price-content ration is perceived to be more attractive. It is 
frequent for low-cost disruptions to determine the emergence of one or more 
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market leader at the expense of incumbents who suffer much from the 
innovation and often find it difficult to respond. Finally, new-market 
disruptions can represent huge opportunities for the innovating company, 
but also some opportunities for other companies who manage to ride the 
market growth that originated from the new combination brought along by 
the innovator. 
The Ikea case is a typical example of a low-cost disruption, at the expense 
of traditional home furniture manufacturers (and sellers). To some extent it 
also triggered some market development, but its nature is much focused on 
the low-cost approach. 
As anticipated, Ryanair has some similar features, with the particular aspect 
of featuring a considerable market expansion induced by the activation of 
new demand. 
The Technogym case combines some elements of “sustaining” innovation 
(performance attributes) with the creation of a new market space, and this 
applies also to Apple, for which however the new-market disruption appears 
on a larger scale. 
We could therefore argue that strategy innovations tend to feature varying 
degrees of these types of innovation in interesting combinations: they tend 
to combine a “new market disruption” (identifying opportunities to trigger 
new users and amplify demand) with a balanced mix of a “sustaining” 
approach (improving the key performance attributes for existing customers) 
and “low-cost” approach. 
 
Intensity of strategy innovation 
Let’s now deal with the second point previously outlined, that is the 
intensity of strategy innovation. 
Throughout all this paper we have aimed at providing a description of 
situations when strategy does not consist just in playing the game better (the 
“improvement” element), but rather in promoting innovations that redefine 
the competitive game to a considerable extent. The set of elements that have 
been identified so far (who, what, how, profit model) can act as a checklist 
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to ascertain whether any given firm has introduced relevant innovations 
across them, and firms can pursue a multiplicity of avenues to do so. 
Before going further, it is worth asking ourselves this question (and the 
reader might forgive us if it appears quite naïve): when investigating 
strategy innovation should we consider changes with respect to what the 
company was doing before, or with respect to the typical approach adopted 
in the industry? It is rather clear that in our reasoning what matters is the 
second aspect. In other words, a company might be introducing an 
innovation that implies focusing on a different target, providing a different 
product, with some changes in its chain compared to what the company had 
been doing before: it is obvious that for the company in question this 
represents an innovation in its strategy (and one could read it as a “strategy 
innovation”), but what matters for us is whether such changes are adopted in 
a way that represents a departure from the typical way of competing of the 
firms in the industry. In other words, what truly matters is to ascertain 
whether the innovation being introduced is different from the typical 
strategic conduct of competing firms, hence new for the industry in 
question. To reinstate this concept, if a company has introduced a 
substantial reconfiguration of its business model in a way that imitates 
another successful firm operating in its industry, then we should not 
categorize this as a strategy innovation, as the firm is simply carrying out an 
imitative conduct. 
Having said this, when looking at the four-component “checklist” (who, 
what, how and profit model), one soon realizes that there might be varying 
degrees of intensity and various combinations of the above. In other terms, a 
firm might introduce an innovation that extends the target market (e.g. 
fitness machines for senior people), while another could introduce an 
innovation that completely redefines the target market (e.g. fitness machines 
not just for gyms but also for home use). Similarly, a firm could operate 
some adjustment in its production chain (e.g. outsourcing a production 
phase), a major change (e.g. deciding to be vertically integrated 
downstream, hence directly owning and operating its stores, such as Zara in 
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clothing), or a revolutionary change (e.g. just designing the product and 
coordinating the manufacturing and assembly of components in a Lego-like 
model such as Apple did). This suggests that there can be both varying 
degree of intensity as well as various combinations on the above 
ingredients, and consequently strategy innovation necessarily happens in a 
continuum. 
In other terms, we cannot draw a clear line between situations of “strategy 
innovation” and situations that are not, but we should rather conceive a wide 
range of situations in which innovations that introduce greater differences 
versus the traditional way of operating and that involve more ingredients of 
the business model correspond to greater strategic innovations. On the 
whole, we could argue that strategy innovation takes place when two or 
more elements of the business model are reconfigured in a substantial way: 
this allows to distinguish “strategy innovation” from other “simpler” types 
of innovation (e.g. just a new product, all the rest being equal). 
To dig a bit further, we could imagine building some hypotheses and 
creating a scale capable of measuring such intensity. This could be a 
research exercise requiring detailed and complex observation. In order to 
provide an illustration of this reasoning, one of the simplest possible ways is 
to ascertain the intensity of the change by looking at how it relates to the 
established way of competing in the industry in question. In other words, for 
any ingredient of the business model one could check whether it is: 
- broadly the same to the one commonly adopted in the industry; 
- somewhat different; 
- radically new. 
If we go back again to the four firms that have been looked at (Ikea, 
Ryanair, Technogym and Apple), we could aim at provide a simple 
visualization of the strategic innovations put in place by assigning a value to 
such intensity, with “*” marking no substantial difference, “**” marking 
some difference and “***” marking great difference. Let’s ascertain these 
values for the cases in question. 
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Ikea’s target is partly different (it stretches outside the traditional domain 
but without representing a major breakthrough (score = **), while the 
offering (intended as the product and its marketing mix) represents a major 
departure (score = ***). The chain of activities involves some change as 
reorganization with suppliers and a shift of assembly activities onto 
customers (score = **), while the profit model also entails some degree of 
change (score = **). 
Ryanair features a case where the core of the target is much different, 
particularly in terms of size: rather than conceiving air transport as an 
“elite” or “premium” sector (as it was in the past), it is seen as a “product 
for the masses”, with huge growth potential (score = ***). The offering, 
albeit similar in its essence, shows some differences as it features much 
simplification and standardization (score = **). The chain of activities also 
features much standardization and focus on low costs (score = **), while the 
profit model marks a great difference (score = ***). 
 
Fig. 3. Reading strategy innovation through the intensity of business model 
reconfiguration 
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Source: own elaboration 
 
For Technogym the situation is partly similar to Ikea with respect to the first 
three elements of the business model, but the profit model can be seen as 
not that innovative (selling fitness machines).  
For Apple while the target does not involve considerable changes (score = 
*), the offering and the chain are quite new (score = ***), and the profit 
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model changes by incorporating both the margins on the sale of music 
players as well as the music (as well as video) distribution channels. Figure 
3 provides a summary of the scores assigned to each innovative company. 
We could derive a visual illustration by creating a diagram where the 
changes in the business model introduced by the four firms are measured by 
marking the score (*, ** and ***) alongside four dimensions that 
correspond to the four elements. In practice, “*” equals to the origin of the 
axis, “***” lies far from the origin, and “**” in between (figure  4). 
 
Fig. 4. Reading strategy innovation as intensity of business model 
reconfiguration 
4. Profit
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3. How
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Source: own elaboration 
 
The combination of the visual diagram and the scores that are summed up in 
figure 3 generate the illustration provided in figure 5 (please note that the 
dots in each axis have been connected with straight lines just for the sake of 
making the illustration more visual for the reader – the emerging area does 
not necessarily have a specific intended meaning in our reasoning). 
By looking at the figure one can visually grasp how firms might develop 
strategy innovations by pursuing different routes that is emphasizing 
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varying combinations of changes in the components of the business model. 
This suggests that there can be limitless possibilities of devising changes of 
varying intensity, and combining them in original ways. Therefore what 
truly matters for a firm is to find out which combinations are actually 
capable of being profitable. Some firms might have the capability to “see 
through” new combinations plus the resources and the commitment to 
implement them, and winning firms can exploit advantages of some kind so 
that other firms cannot replicate such combinations in a way that can match 
what the initial innovator has managed to do. 
 
Fig. 5. Reconfiguration of the business model in the four cases 
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Source: own elaboration 
 
It is interesting to note that while there can be different routes to promote 
strategy innovation, by reconfiguring individual components of the business 
model with varying degrees of intensity, successful firms manage to operate 
choices that have high internal consistency so that they are self-reinforcing 
and exploit complementarities (Buzzavo 2007, Casadesus-Masanell and 
Ricart 2011). Again, going back to the Schumpeterian lens, it is the 
Leonardo Buzzavo - Strategy Innovation as Business Model Reconfiguration 
 33 
combination aspect (and the ability to exploit complementarities) that truly 
matters. 
 
7. Concluding remarks and perspectives 
 
What is strategy innovation 
We have aimed at tracing back the emergence of the notion of strategy 
innovation (and business model innovation) in literature, while attempting 
to bring many of the labels and definitions revolving around strategy 
innovation under a common frame. We have attempted to show that strategy 
innovation equals business model innovation, and consists in the ability of a 
firm to carry out a reconfiguration of the business model exploiting internal 
consistency and complementarities so to trigger a transformation in the 
industry by redefining the established ways of operating in favor of new 
combinations. 
A business model can be articulated in many ingredients, but in simple 
terms if consists in: 
- the target (who) - who is the target of the company; 
- the offering (what) - what is the company providing the intended target 
with; 
- the chain of processes involved (how), both inside and outside the 
company, that are generating the offering in question; 
- the profit model - how a company is extracting value from the target 
customers in a profitable manner. 
Strategy innovation is therefore a complementary perspective to the 
traditional categories of product and process innovation that have been a 
constant ingredient of business studies for quite some time. On the whole, 
strategy innovation consists in business model innovation, so that the two 
things end up being broadly the same. 
The new combinations of individual elements of the business model can 
feature innovations that, in Christensen’s (1997) terms, can include 
elements of sustaining innovations (mainly focusing on existing customers), 
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low-cost (addressing over-served customers) and new-market disruptions 
(addressing non-customers). But a key aspect is the ability to make the new 
combination of business model elements internally consistent and capable 
of being self-reinforcing hence exploiting complementarities (Casadesus-
Masanell and Ricart 2011). 
 
Strategy innovation is not “new” 
As we have tried to highlight, “strategy innovation” is a label that has 
become quite common in strategic literature over the last two decades. 
However, it would be quite wrong to miss how it represents a lens to look at 
innovations over a considerable time span. The century-old fordist model of 
production, for example, can be considered a case of strategy innovation. 
First, it has broken the cost-differentiation trade-off, introducing an 
affordable means of transportation in a context where automobiles were 
quite expensive products. The market could vastly grow taking advantage of 
the high elasticity of demand. Secondly, the production system has been 
dramatically reorganized through the adoption of Taylorist principles, 
moving from a craft-like model of production to a mass manufacturing 
system making wide use of standardization, setting new efficiency 
standards. Thirdly, the industry has been transformed with the gradual 
extinction of small volume players and the establishment of industrial 
giants. Within the automotive industry, another strategy innovation 
manifested about half a century later, then Japanese manufacturers (and 
Toyota in particular) introduced lean production techniques (Womack et al. 
1990). The offering has been redefined by the capability to develop 
differentiated products with high quality levels at reasonable costs (breaking 
the trade-off). The production chain has been reorganized through intense 
cooperation with suppliers (co-design), organized in vertically tiered 
schemes. The industry has been later transformed with the entry of Japanese 
players into the US market (and then in Europe), a redistribution of market 
shares, and the need for Western players to adopt lean production 
techniques to boost productivity and quality levels. 
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Strategy or “strategic” innovation? 
As discussed, strategy innovation basically consists in business model 
innovation, and more and more authors are referring to it by the latter 
approach. While we do not know yet whether the research community will 
lean towards the former or latter approach (and we feel quite comfortable in 
using both terms as broadly equivalent), we would argue that we prefer the 
term “strategy innovation” versus “strategic innovation” (that is sometimes 
used), for two inter-connected reasons. First, innovation represents the 
application of an idea that generates value. As a consequence, it can be 
considered “strategic” by definition, and the expression “strategic 
innovation” creates a sort of redundant / tautological expression. Secondly, 
“strategy innovation” mirrors more established expressions such as “product 
innovation” and “process innovation”, where the entity being redefined is 
the word (rather than the adjective) preceding the word innovation. In other 
words, “strategy innovation” leads us to think of an innovation in the 
strategy content, and/or in how it is developed and implemented, while 
“strategic innovation” can lead to think of an innovation holding strategic 
value (and, as said, any innovation should have some).  
 
Strategy innovation is about generation of new combinations with an 
entrepreneurial drive: it is more of an art than a science 
One final important point to underline is that as it has been shown 
throughout this work, strategy innovation resides in the capability to see 
new opportunities for combinations in the business model. Such capability 
of “seeing through”, of “insight” puts the spotlight away from the classical 
aspect of “selecting” the best strategy (that was a typical feature of the 
leading thinking on strategy during the 1980s, for example as in Porter’s 
work), while emphasizing the need to better understand how key strategic 
actors can train and enhance the capability of seeing and generating new 
combinations. 
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On the whole, improving our understanding of strategy innovation dynamics 
implies: 
- a broader look at how strategy unfolds within firms, as for example 
approaches that provide a complementary look to the strategy content 
and strategy process approach, such as “strategy as practice” as codified 
by Whittington (1996); 
- a deeper investigation of the “art” elements that operate inside strategy 
besides its more studied “science” dimension, as in Mintzberg (2009); 
- a more thorough and structured analysis of how new business models 
are generated and which tools are useful, such as in Osterwalder and 
Pigneur (2009), as well as the barriers involved (Chesbrough 2010). 
This implies also a better understanding of how firms (with the 
entrepreneurs and top managers in them) promote “ambidexterity”, that 
is a combination of exploitation of existing conditions and exploration 
of new avenues (O’Reilly III and Tushman 2011). 
On the whole, more focus should be directed to a more profound bridging of 
the theoretical concepts with situations of innovative companies that are 
unfolding in the real world promoting higher cross-fertilization. 
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